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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiffs (appellants) 
after judgment had been obtained against them on a note held by 
defendant (respondent) Bank of Ephraim, to require defendant Bank 
to apply certain security held by it against the judgment debt 
before proceeding against the plaintiffs (appellants) on the 
judgment obtained, and for damages against all defendants arising 
out of various charges of interference with business relations 
and harrassment. Defendants (respondents) Barton counterclaimed 
on various grounds, including money obligations due from the 
Plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After trial before the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge in 
the Third Judicial District, sitting with a jury, seven of 
Plaintiffs' causes of action were dismissed by the Court and the 
remaining three causes of action were submitted to the jury, 
resulting in verdicts for Defendants and against Plaintiffs. The 
counterclaim of defendant Bertha Barton was dismissed by the 
court, as was one counterclaim of defendant George Barton; the 
remaining five counterclaims of defendant George Barton were 
submitted to the jury, resulting in verdicts for defendant Barton 
on three causes of action and against defendant Barton on two 
causes of action. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
These respondents seek affirmance by this court of all 
verdicts and judgments entered in the court below which are the 
subject of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These respondents disagree with the statement of facts 
set forth in Appellants' brief, but are in agreement with the 
exceptions thereto as treated in the brief of the respondent Bank 
of Ephraim et al. 
A. The Bank of Ephraim matter. 
For several years prior to 1967 appellant Charles R. 
Kennedy and respondent George Barton had been engaged in various 
business transactions, and in late 1967 said Kennedy approached 
George Barton relative to appellants obtaining a bank loan of 
$40,000 from the Bank of Ephraim, in which Barton was a director. 
The purpose for the loan was to obtain funds for the purchase by 
appellants of 280 acres of land in Montana (R.733). Indication 
was given by Charles R. Kennedy that certain property could 
secure the loan (R.740). A letter of of recommendation was sent 
by George Barton to respondent Bank, wherein he indicated that he 
was certain the Kennedys "will furnish any amount of security you 
may require.• (R.l6-P). The Bank granted but did not collater-
alize the loan, and one week later the note was presented to 
-2-
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George Barton for his signature on the back of the note as 
guarantor (R.896). Some 60-90 days after the loan was 
consummated, in response to the request of the President of 
respondent Bank, George Barton endorsed a $50,000 certificate of 
deposit (held in the names of George Barton or Bertha Barton or 
G. DeVon Barton) as security for the Kennedy loan in order that 
the bank examiners would be satisfied (R.899). 
All of the proceeds of the loan were received by 
appellants and were used by them to purchase the said 280 acres, 
which they still own and which at the time of trial was the 
subject of attachment by the respondent Bank (R.734). Subsequent 
to the consummation of the initial loan, the loan maturity dates 
were extended, and the loan renewed in various amounts on 
numerous occasions. On the occasions of these renewals and 
extensions appellants represented that they would pay the note 
and that respondent Barton would not be requi~ed to make payment 
(R.736, 737). 
Periodically certain payments were made on the loan 
balance by appellants (R.724) and on one occasion the interest 
owing in the amount of $4,095.00 was paid by George Barton to 
obtain an extension of time for appellants (R.915), who executed 
their note in the same amount in favor of said respondent for 
such payment (Ex.29-d). At the time of trial a verdict and 
judgment for the balance due on that note was rendered in favor 
of respondent George Barton, and against appellants (R.549, 484). 
Such verdict and judgment are not the subject of appeal. 
-3-
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Appellants defaulted on the final renewal note in favor 
of the Bank of Ephraim (R.734) and litigation was initiated 
against appellants to collect the then balance of the loan and 
other sums owing the bank; and judgment in favor of the Bank was 
entered on July 25, 1973 (Ex.58-d). No appeal was taken from 
that judgment. The respondent Barton was named as a defendant in 
the foregoing action, but was not served with summons (R.788). 
The appellants brought suit claiming damages arising from the 
foregoing transactions. 
B. The Barclays Bank matter. 
On August 24, 1970, appellant Charles R. Kennedy borrowed 
$35,000.00 from the Barclays Bank of California, and as the sole 
maker executed a demand note in favor of that Bank (Ex.41-d). 
At the request of said Kennedy (R.937-938), the 
respondent George Barton had executed an instrument of guaranty 
which covered the foregoing debt obligation of the appellant 
Charles R. Kennedy (Ex.42-d). Respondent Barton received none of 
the proceeds of the loan (R.937, 966). Following default on said 
note in favor of Barclays Bank of California, Charles R. Kennedy 
and George Barton were sued, and judgment was awarded Barclays 
Bank of California against each of them for $42,951.33, which 
included principal, accrued interest, attorney's fees and costs 
(Ex.43-d). Respondent George Barton paid Barclays Bank (Ex.44-d) 
and took an assignment of the judgment (Ex.45-d). He sought and 
was awarded a favorable verdict and judgment under his 
counterclaim against the appellant Charles R. Kennedy in this 
matter. 
-4-
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C. The Barton Syndicate matter. 
In July of 1970 at the instance of appellant Charles R. 
Kennedy it was agreed that said appellant and respondent George 
Barton would each sell a 10% interest in the Barton Syndicate to 
one, J.D. Kennedy, the total 20% interest being sold for $25,000 
(R.925-926). The instrument conveying the interests was executed 
on July 29, 1970 (Ex.38-d). Appellant Charles R. Kennedy 
received the $25,000, $12,500 of which was for the benefit of 
respondent George Barton (R.928). 
Appellant Charles R. Kennedy failed to remit the $12,500 
despite repeated demands therefor (R.929-930). At the time of 
the last demand, Charles R. Kennedy stated that he had •used the 
money to live on" (R.931). Appellant Charles R. Kennedy at trial 
stated that he held the net proceeds from the J.D. Kennedy 
transaction in two certificates of deposit of $10,000 each, 
($25,000, less expenses and commission), one certificate in the 
name of Charles R. Kennedy, and the other held jointly with his 
wife, Rebecca Kennedy (R.l015; 1020). By way of counterclaim 
respondent George Barton prayed and received, a favorable verdict 
and judgment in this matter. 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICTS AND JUDGMENTS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
IN FAVOR OF THE BANK OF EPHRAIM AND ITS 
DIRECTORS SHOULD BE UPHELD 
It is submitted that the verdicts and judgments of the 
lower court in favor of the respondent Bank of Ephraim and its 
Directors should be upheld, thereby allowing said Bank to enforce 
that certain judgment entered on July 25, 1973, in the District 
Court of Sanpete County, State of Utah, against the named 
judgment debtors therein, which include the appellants in this 
action (Ex.58-d). 
In support of this position, respondents Barton adopt and 
incorporate by reference herein the authorities and arguments as 
set forth in the brief of the respondents Bank of Ephraim, Virgil 
P. Jacobsen, Curtis T. Armstrong, L. Cannon Anderson and Ruel E. 
Christensen, as heretofore filed. 
In addition to such adoption and incorporation, these 
respondents invite the attention of the court to certain 
additional evidence in the record which is deemed pertinent to 
the issues. 
Under cross-examination, the appellant Charles R. Kennedy 
testified as follows in reference to the initial loan of 
$40,000.00 on November 27, 1967, and the renewals thereof: 
"Q. Just to - there's no question you and 
your wife got $40,000.00--? 
A. That's correct. 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. All right. No question that you used 
that money to purchase the property in 
Montana, that 280 acres? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. There isn't any question that the 
attachment you are complaining of is on 
that 280 acres, isn't that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. There isn't any question that you and 
your wife defaulted on the loan--that 
is, the final renewal note--isn't that 
correct? 
A. On the final renewal note we defaulted, 
yes. • (R. 733, 734) 
******** 
"Q. Well, now Mr. Kennedy, in regards to the 
bank loan which you got the property to 
buy, you got the money to buy the 
Montana property and renewals of that 
during--the renewals and extensions 
covered about a five-year period, didn't 
they; 1967 into 1972? 
A. Yes, Mr. Gee. 
Q. And most of the notes were for about a 
60 to 90 day maturity period, were they 
not? 
A. I believe that could be true. 
Q. Yes. So that there were many renewals 
and many extensions during that period? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. George Barton periodically would 
intercede in your behalf and ask for 
extensions and renewals, would he not? 
Isn't that correct? 
A. Yes, because Mr. Barton's--
Q. Well now--. 
A. Mr. Barton was affiliated with me--
-7-
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Q. Well--. 
A. --on many things and knew what we were 
doing. 
Q. He asked for renewals and extensions 
and--. 
A. Yes. 
Q. On your representation that the 
obligation would be paid; isn't that 
correct? 
A. That's right. That's correct. 
Q. And you told the bank officers on many 
occasions you would pay that note? 
A. I did. 
Q. And every time you made a renewal or 
extension you promised that you would 
pay? 
A. I did. 
Q. And on occasions you told Virgil 
Jacobson, 'Virgil, I would'-- in effect, 
'I want to pay the note'? 
A. I did. 
Q. But the bank was cooperative and went 
along; did they not? 
A. They sure did. 
Q. For five years? 
A. They certainly did. 
Q, Then you wrote letters to the bank 
indicating that it was your obligation, 
you wanted it to stand on its own two 
feet, words to that effect? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You told Mr. Barton on a number of 
occasions, both in relation to this note 
and other notes, that he would never 
have to pay a note that he guaranteed in 
your behalf; isn't that correct? 
-8-
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A. I did and I believed that at that time.• 
(R. 935, 937) 
In further reference to the Bank of Ephraim loan, on 
cross-examination Charles R. Kennedy testified: 
"Q. But you told him (Mr. Barton) on 
repeated occasions that he would never 
have to pay that: isn't that right? 
A. That is correct.• (R.742) 
The testimony of appellant Rebecca Kennedy was to a 
similar effect (R. 824, 825). 
The foregoing evidence clearly indicates that the 
appellants acknowledged receipt of the proceeds, and their 
primary obligation to pay the Bank of Ephraim loan, and sets 
forth their representations in that regard to both Bank officials 
and respondent George Barton. 
Some two years after the initial loan by the Bank of 
Ephraim, appellant Charles R. Kennedy, on November 18, 1969, 
wrote the Bank, in part, as follows: 
"Gentlemen: 
RE: OUR LOAN OF $45,000.00 
Within a few days our note for 
$45,000.00 shall be due for payment plus 
interest. I wish to mention now, Mr. 
Jacobsen, a matter that has been very 
close to my heart. When I first sought 
a loan from your bank it had been my 
desire for my loan to stand on its own 
feet - as all my obligations have stood 
in the past. I am rather proud of my 
record over the past years, for it 
represents many hours of work. Instead, 
my loan was secured by the signature of 
Mr. George Barton - and as I now under-
stand the matter, by his collateral 
as well. 
-9-
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******** 
This should not be, for my assets over 
my debts would warrant such a loan - and 
- I have treated my loan at your bank 
with honor; and every loan I have been 
granted in my lifetime. 
I would like for my obligation at your 
bank to stand on its own feet.***" 
(Emphasis added) (Ex. 28-d) 
As late as April 15, 1972, a few days before the Sanpete 
County litigation was initiated, appellant wrote Virgil Jacobsen, 
President of the Bank, a letter, the tenor of which indicates his 
primary liability (Ex.33-d). In that letter he writes, in part: 
"I wish to pay that note, Virgil***" 
The last renewal note of the subject Bank loan, upon 
which suit was brought by the respondent Bank, was executed by 
the appellants, and only by the appellants, as makers. 
Respondent Barton appears in the capacity of guarantor on the 
reverse side of the note (Ex. 58-d}. Further evidence of the 
appellants recognizing their primary liability is seen in the 
payment of certain sums on the loan balance by them (R.724). On 
one occasion when interest in the amount of $4,095 was paid by 
respondent George Barton, to obtain an extension of time for 
appellants (R.915), the appellants executed their note in the 
same amount in favor of such respondent (Ex.29-d). 
From the foregoing testimony and evidence, as well as 
that cited by the other respondents in their brief, which is 
-10-
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herein incorporated, it is clear that the intent and agreement 
was that the appellants Kennedy were to be primarily liable to 
pay the Bank of Ephraim obligation. The claim by the appellants 
that there was an oral agreement that the certificate of deposit 
would be the first source of funds in the event of default is 
without any support in the record, and is in fact refuted by the 
record (R. 795; 769; 785-787; 894-900). Considerable time 
elapsed before the appellants Kennedy even knew of the 
certificate (Ex. 28-d; R. 822). Any claim by the appellants as 
to such oral agreement partakes of appellate fantasy. 
The appellants claim the non-applicability of res 
judicata, a defense raised by all the respondents, based upon the 
judgment rendered in the District Court in and for Sanpete 
County, State of Utah, as aforementioned (Ex. 58-d). In support 
of their position in this regard, appellants cite the Utah case 
of Richards v. Hodson, 26 U. 2d 113; 485 P. 2d 1044, and quote 
part of a paragraph of that decision. The full paragraph reads: 
"Strictly speaking, the term 'res 
judicata' applies to a judgment between 
the same parties who in a prior action 
litigated the identical questions which 
are present in the later case. Not only 
are the parties bound by the ruling on 
matters actually litigated, but they are 
also prevented from raising issues which 
should have been raised in the former 
action. The rule of law is wise in that 
it gives finality to judgments and also 
conserves the time of courts, in that 
courts should not be required to 
relitigate matters which have once been 
fully and finally determined." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The liability of the appellants to the respondent Bank 
-11-
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under their promissory note in question was fully and finally 
determined in the Sanpete County litigation. No appeal was taken 
from the judgment rendered. Under Richards, the appellants 
cannot relitigate the issue of their liability, and the defenses 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel are available to 
respondents on that issue. Nor can the appellants now raise 
issues against the respondent Bank which should have been raised 
in the former action. 
In their statement of facts and arguments, appellants 
claim respondent George Barton was paid a commission or finder's 
fee for the initial Bank of Ephraim loan. However, respondent 
testified the funds were accepted to apply on a pre-existing debt 
(R. 801-802). Appellants further assert that George Barton 
acknowledged that he hoped to be paid for his se~vices in helping 
to obtain the loan. This assertion is incorrect -- the services 
about which respondent George Barton was testifying related to 
employment by the Kennedy Corporation, for which services he was 
never compensated (R. 980). 
Aside from its irrelevancy, the claim by appellants that 
they are unable to pay the loan in question is without substance. 
The financial statements of appellants, including the value of 
the 280 acres in Montana alone, indicate the ability of 
appellants to pay their obligation. (Ex. 25-d; 30-d; 33-d; 
R.809, 903). 
-12-
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As indicated, these respondents adopt and incorporate by 
reference the argument and authority as set forth in the brief of 
the respondent Bank of Ephraim, et al. By reason of the same, 
and the additional argument and authority herein made, it is 
submitted that the verdicts and judgments in favor of said Bank 
and its directors at the trial below should be affirmed. The law 
was correctly applied in this case and the instructions proposed 
by appellants, numbers 2, 6 and 17 were properly refused. 
Point II 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN, 
NOR PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS REFUSED, NOR IN THE 
VERDICT RENDERED OR JUDGMENT THEREON, RELATIVE 
TO THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER DEFENDANT 
BARTON'S COUNTERCLAIM 
The appellant Charles R. Kennedy has challenged the 
verdict of the jury, and judgment thereon, in favor of respondent 
George Barton under the Fifth Cause of Action of said Barton's 
counterclaim, said appellant claiming error by reason of the 
trial court failing to give his proposed instruction No. 16. The 
ultimate position of the appellant in this regard would require a 
reduction of such judgment in favor of George Barton by one-half. 
In this particular matter, appellant Charles R. Kennedy 
on August 24, 1970, borrowed $35,000.00 from the Barclays Bank of 
California, and as the sole maker executed a demand note in favor 
of that Bank, the loan amount bearing interest thereunder at the 
rate of 9% per annum (Ex. 41-d). 
At the request of said Kennedy (R.937-938), respondent 
-13-
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George Barton had executed an instrument of guaranty which 
covered the foregoing debt obligation of the appellant Charles R. 
Kennedy (Ex. 42-d). Respondent Barton received none of the 
proceeds of the loan (R.937, 966). Following default on said 
note in favor of Barclays Bank of California, Charles R. Kennedy 
and George Barton were sued, and judgment was awarded Barclays 
Bank of California against each of them, for $42,951.33, which 
included principal, accrued interest, attorney's fees and costs 
(Ex. 43-d). (In the Barclays Bank proceeding in the lower court, 
including the rendition of the judgment, both Charles R. Kennedy 
and George Barton were represented by common counsel, Weston 
Bayles, as reflected in the file of that case, Civil No. 203369, 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, of 
which the trial court took judicial notice. Mr. Bayles regularly 
represented Mr. Charles R. Kennedy.) Respondent George Barton 
paid Barclays Bank (Ex. 44-d) and took an assignment of the 
judgment (Ex. 45-d). 
The appellant Charles R. Kennedy apparently claims, 
because he signed the instrument of guaranty, as well as being 
the sole maker of the Barclays Bank note, that by reason of the 
terms of the guaranty as to joint and several liability, the 
principle of contribution limits the obligation of said Kennedy 
to one-half of the aggregate amount. The law is to the contrary. 
According to the case of Hampel et at v. Mitchell, 36 
F.2d 223: 
"***There is no right of contribution in 
favor of one who owes the whole of a 
debt as principal against his surety.• 
-14-
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72 C.J.S., Principal and Surety, §353, p.815 states the rule as 
follows: 
Where the relationship between a surety 
and another is not that of cosuretyship, 
the right and liability to contribution 
based on such relation does not exist. 
Accordingly, a surety is not liable for 
contribution to his principal; nor can a 
person who, although appearing to be a 
surety on an instrument, is in fact the 
principal, having received part or all 
of the sum borrowed, or who has sub-
sequently become the principal by 
assuming the indebtedness, have con-
tribution from a surety for the debt.*** 
See also Taylor v. Joiner, (Ark.) 24 S.W.2d 326. 
Further, it is submitted that the citations of appellants 
are inapplicable to the facts of this case, for the true 
relationship of appellant Charles R. Kennedy and George Barton in 
the Barclays Bank matter is that of principal, and guarantor or 
surety, respectively. 
According to 38 C.J.S., Guaranty, Sl, p. 1129: 
A "guaranty" or "guarantee" may be 
generally defined as a collateral 
promise or undertaking by one person to 
answer for the payment of some debt or 
the performance of some contract or duty 
in case of the default of another 
person, who in the first instance is 
liable for such payment or performance; 
a collateral promise or undertaking to 
pay a debt owing by a third person in 
case the latter does not pay. It is an 
agreement by one person to answer to 
another for the debt, default, or 
miscarriage of a third person;*** 
See also 72 C.J.S., Principal and Surety, §2, p. 515. 
As noted, appellant Charles R. Kennedy was the sole maker 
of the note in question, the obligation of respondent George 
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Barton being secondary. 
By reason of the foregoing relationship of the parties 
the doctrine of subrogation is here controlling. 
According to 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Guaranty Sl27, p. 1135: 
•The doctrine of subrogation may be 
invoked by the guarantor where the 
principal debtor has defaulted in the 
payment or performance of his obligation 
and the creditor has enforced the 
contract of guaranty. In this 
situation, the guarantor is substituted 
in place of the creditor and is entitled 
to assert any rights that the latter may 
have had by way of proceeding against 
the debtor or by resort to security. 
The debtor's obligation to pay the debt 
is, therefore, not extinguished by the 
guarantor's payment thereof. However, 
even though the guarantor has taken an 
assignment of the obligation, he can 
recover from the principal only the 
amount which he paid for the 
obligation.• 
•The guarantor's cause of action against 
the principal debtor accrues without any 
demand or notice of the payment. A 
judgment against the guarantor obtained 
in a court of competent jurisdiction, 
and paid by the guarantor, if not shown 
to be fraudulent, establishes the 
liability of the debtor to the 
guarantor.***• 
•where the guaranty was executed at the 
debtor's request, the debtor is said to 
have impliedly agreed to reimburse the 
guarantor.***" 
In 72 C.J.S., Principal and Surety, Section 316, pp 777-779, it 
is stated: 
•rn the absence of an express agreement, 
there is, in a relationship of principal 
and surety, an implied contract that the 
principal will indemnify or reimburse 
the surety for any payment the latter 
may make to the creditor or any loss he 
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may sustain in compliance with the 
contract of suretyship, and save the 
surety harmless. This implied contract 
has been held to arise or take effect 
when the suretyship is made or 
contracted, and not when payment is made 
by the surety thereunder or when the 
surety sustains his loss; payment merely 
fixes the amount of damages for which 
the principal is liable under his 
original agreement to indemnify the 
surety, relates back to the time the 
contract was entered into by which the 
liability to pay was incurred, and 
matures the cause of action. Under 
other authority, however, an implied 
promise on the part of the principal to 
reimburse the surety arises in favor of 
the latter through, or immediately on, 
his payment of the debt.w 
83 C.J.S., Subrogation, SSO at p. 678, states: 
"A judgment obtained against the 
principal may be transferred by the 
judgment creditor to the surety who 
satisfied the judgment, and, in a 
majority of states where a surety, on 
paying the judgment, takes an assignment 
thereof either to himself or a third 
person, he may enforce the judgment 
against the principal.*** An assignment 
to the surety, it is held, is subord-
inate to the rights of subrogation, and 
the right of the surety to pursue the 
assigned judgment depends on subrogation 
rather than on the assignment. Indeed, 
it is held that no actual assignment is 
necessary; the surety is considered on 
equitable principles as entitled to an 
assignment, and equity will consider as 
done that which should have been done, 
and, if necessary for this protection, 
will decree an assignment to be made." 
See also 73 Am. Jur. 2d., Subrogation §124, pp. 679-680. 
In the Utah case of Beaver County v. Home Indemnity 
Company, et al, 88 Utah 1, 52 P.2d. 435, the discussion on 
subrogation or substitution has relevance here. In tracing the 
history and applicability of the doctrine, this court has stated: 
-17-
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"***It began as a rather narrow doctrine 
borrowed from Roman or civil law and was 
confined to the case where one 
secondarily liable was compelled to pay 
the debt of one primarily liable.***The 
surety or guarantor was permitted to 
indemnify itself from its principal by 
succeeding to the rights of the creditor 
against such principal. It should not 
be overlooked that in many cases where 
subrogation is allowed, there exists a 
direct right against the principal 
debtor, either by express or implied 
contract. Thus, in cases of suretyship 
and guaranty, there is, if not an 
express contract, as in the instant 
case, an implied contract that the 
principal should indemnify the surety if 
the latter is compelled to pay the 
creditor.***Equity rapidly extended the 
use of this very salutary principle 
until it became apparent that the only 
ultimate rule which could be said to 
govern the principle is that equity 
would apply it wherever it was necessary 
to do equity or justice or prevent an 
injustice. The principle was also 
applied wherever properly pleaded facts 
existed, which made the principle 
applicable. Where one paid the debt of 
another under duty or compulsion or a 
promise so as to take that payment out 
of the class of voluntary payments, as 
the term voluntary was used in the law, 
then equity, recognizing such debtor 
should not unjustly enrich himself by 
the retention of property which he 
should apply to the debt, permitted the 
payor of the debt to be substituted to 
the creditor. Thus, the debtor was 
pursued and the one which should 
ultimately respond was made to 
respond.*** The text-writers and 
students of the subject endeavor, by an 
examination of various cases, where the 
doctrine had been applied, or appli-
cation denied, to scientificize the 
subject by classifying the cases and 
deriving therefrom a set of rules; but 
in the last analysis, the ultimate 
principle is the only one from which it 
is safe to reason, to wit, that equity 
employs subrogation when that doctrine 
is necessary to work out a just solution 
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of the problem. Subrogation will be 
extended as far as it is necessary to 
accomplish this. Whenever, in respect 
to the involuntary payment of a debt, it 
is just and equitable that some one else 
more fundamentally liable or when it 
would work an inequity if ultimate 
payment did not fall on him, there 
subrogation will be permitted.***• 
See also Running v. Widdes, (Wise.) 190 N.W. 2d 169. 
It is our conviction that the applicable law in this 
instance is that of the doctrine of subrogation and not 
contribution; that the instruction to the jury No. 24, (R.466) 
reflects the principle of subrogation, and in any event as a 
matter of law respondent George Barton was entitled to full 
recovery over and against appellant Charles R. Kennedy by reason 
of the foregoing authority. For the said appellant to ask this 
court to slice in half the judgment awarded to respondent George 
Barton under his Fifth Cause of Action ignores both the facts and 
the law. 
POINT III 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN THE INSTRUCTIONS 
GIVEN, NOR IN THE VERDICT RENDERED, NOR IN THE 
JUDGMENT THEREON, RELATIVE TO THE THIRD CAUSE 
OF ACTION UNDER DEFENDANT BARTON'S COUNTERCLAIM 
Appellant Charles R. Kennedy challenges the verdict and 
judgment in favor of respondent George Barton under the Third 
Cause of Action of his counterclaim. Prior to July 29, 1970, 
appellant Charles R. Kennedy introduced one J.D. Kennedy to 
respondent George Barton, whereupon at the instance of said 
appellant, discussion was had regarding the Barton Syndicate 
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mining claims. It was subsequently agreed that said appellant 
and respondent would each sell a 10% interest in the Syndicate to 
J.D. Kennedy, the total 20% interest being sold for $25,000.00. 
The instrument conveying the interests was executed on July 29, 
1970 (Ex. 38-d). Appellant Charles R. Kennedy received the 
$25,000.00, $12,500.00 of which was for the benefit of respondent 
George Barton. During one period in 1970-71, Charles R. Kennedy 
was authorized by George Barton to invest such proceeds in 
acquiring a controlling interest in a certain corporation, which 
investment was not consummated (R.976-977). 
Appellant Charles R. Kennedy failed to remit the 
$12,500.00 despite repeated demands therefor (R. 929-930). At 
the time of the last demand, Charles R. Kennedy stated that he 
had "used the money to live on" (R. 931). Appellant Charles R. 
Kennedy at trial stated that he held the net proceeds from the J. 
D. Kennedy transaction in two certificates of deposit of 
$10,000.00 each, ($25,000.00, less expenses and claimed 
commission), one certificate in the name of Charles R. Kennedy, 
and the other held jointly with his wife, Rebecca Kennedy (R. 
1015; 1020). The jury verdict and judgment in favor of 
respondent George Barton relative to the foregoing transaction 
was in the sum of $12,000.00. 
In an attempt to obscure or excuse his flagrant failure 
to remit and account for the proceeds due respondent George 
Barton, as aforesaid, appellant Charles R. Kennedy refers to an 
unrelated and separate transaction in which respondent George 
Barton and Charles R. Kennedy, as trustee for Anna R. Kerch, each 
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acquired a 12 1/2% interest in the Barton Syndicate from one M. 
S. Rosenberger, in December of 1971. In that transaction, 
Rosenberger had contacted respondent George Barton for the 
purpose of selling his 25% interest, and indicated he would not 
sell to Charles R. Kennedy under any circumstances (R.971-972). 
A sale price of $1,000.00 was negotiated by George Barton (R. 
982). Charles R. Kennedy proposed to George Barton that he 
(Kennedy) would put up the full purchase price in return for one-
half of the interest, inasmuch as he could not buy from 
Rosenberger. The transaction closed on such proposal (R. 982-
983). There was no discussion or agreement that the Rosenberger 
transaction had any relation to the J.D. Kennedy transaction, or 
that it would excuse any indebtedness owing by Charles R. Kennedy 
to George Barton arising from the J. D. Kennedy transaction (R. 
983). 
Appellant Charles R. Kennedy in his brief in essence 
claims because he and George Barton participated in the 
Rosenberger venture which resulted in a so-called "good deal", 
that somehow he is relieved of the fiduciary duty of remitting 
funds which he held for the benefit of said Barton arising out of 
a separate and distinct transaction. To adopt the argument of 
appellant Charles R. Kennedy in this matter is to allow him to 
realize $24,000.00 cash, and George Barton no cash return 
whatever, even though both sold and purchased equal interests in 
the syndicate, which admittedly would be a "good deal" for 
Charles R. Kennedy, but hardly meet equitable standards as to 
respondent George Barton. 
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Appellant Charles R. Kennedy in effect complains that the 
jury should have been instructed in such a way as to consider the 
basics of his argument. As noted, the argument is inherently 
deficient. Moreover, a careful reading of the requested 
instructions of appellants reveals no such instruction covering 
the point so argued in their brief; nor could the objection of 
appellants to Instruction 21 convey to the trial court what 
appellants now claim as error (R.l069). 
In the case of Kesler v. Rogers, (Utah) 542 P.2d 354, 
this court stated: 
Defendants' contention of error in the 
instructions to the jury centers upon 
the failure of the court to tell the 
jury that because the interrogatories 
submitted to them concerning the intent 
of the parties involved conflict with 
written instruments, they must find such 
facts by clear and convincing evidence. 
Plaintiff's rejoinder to this, in which 
we see merit, is that the defendant did 
not submit a request for such an 
instruction. Moreover, in the taking of 
exceptions to the instructions which 
were given, there was no clear and 
correct statement to the court as to 
what instructions defendant desired in 
that regard. He is therefore not in a 
position to complain about failure to 
give a correct instruction. 
See also Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Shupe v. 
Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246; Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 
Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185. 
Further, the Rosenberger transaction was not set forth as 
an affirmative defense in the pleadings by appellant Charles R. 
Kennedy. [R.l38-140 (Reply to Counterclaim of George Barton)] 
Evidence as to that transaction was objected to by respondents 
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Barton as being "immaterial, irrelevant, outside the scope of the 
pleadings***" (R.971, 972). The objection was overruled (R.972), 
but no motion was made by appellants to amend their pleadings. 
Finally to theorize on why the jury entered its verdict 
in favor of respondent George Barton on his Third Cause of 
Action, in the amount of $12,000.00, instead of $12,500.00, is 
sheer speculation. If anyone has standing to complain of that 
differential, it is respondent George Barton, not the appellant 
Charles R. Kennedy. It is not prejudicial to the appellants. As 
was stated by this court in Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283: 
There is a truism which can be safely 
indulged: in any lawsuit such as this 
of several days' duration, counsel can 
usually find something to complain 
about. Nevertheless, when the parties 
have had a full and fair opportunity to 
present their case, and the jury has 
rendered its verdict and the trial court 
has entered its judgment thereon, all 
presumptions favor their validity; and 
the burden is upon the appellant as the 
attacker to show some substantial basis 
for upsetting them. It is well estab-
lished by our Rules of Procedure, de-
rived from statute, and by our decis-
ional law that we will not reverse 
because of mere error, but only if it is 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense 
that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that unfairness or injustice has 
resulted. We are not persuaded that any 
such circumstance exists here. Conse-
quently there is no sufficient basis to 
justify disturbing the verdicts and 
judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument and authorities 
cited, the verdicts and judgments entered in favor of these 
respondents should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONK E, BOYER & BOYLE 
ondents Barton 
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